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The Asian Popular Cultural Scene 
Half a dozen years ago, on my return from Hong Kong to Europe by train, I stopped off in 
Ulaan Bataar, the capital of Mongolia, for a few days. One evening, our guide took us out 
for a night on the town and, after a somewhat reckless taxi ride across town, we ended up 
in a karaoke bar. There we were ushered into a special soundproofed room where we could 
drink, talk and sing as loud as we wished. Even though we were a mixed crowd of 
tourists, we soon found ourselves going through the customary Japanese-style turn-taking 
ritual of singing a song each. At one stage during the – sometimes painful – hilarities that 
followed, I suddenly noticed how confusedly international our gathering was. Not only 
did we come from a variety of countries (England, France, Ireland, Japan, Mongolia, 
Singapore, Switzerland, and the United States) and communicate with one another by 
means of various – occasionally strange – versions of the English language. The 
technology and media forms used for our entertainment were equally hybrid: the popular 
cultural form was Japanese, although the karaoke machine itself was made in Korea; the 
video visuals of both people and backgrounds accompanying our songs on the television 
screen were of Singapore; and the songs could be anything from Frank Sinatra’s “My 
Way” to the latest European Song Contest hit. I think it was when our Mongolian guide 
began singing in Chinese one of his favourite Japanese pop songs that I had a sort of 
intellectual double-take (or what was in effect a quintuple-take). This was globalization in 
action! 
These days, Japanese popular (commercial, commodity, mass, or media) cultural 
forms may be found in one form or another all over the world. From Hollywood re-makes 
of Japanese films to Hong Kong Cantonese re-recordings of Japanese songs, by way of 
street fashions, travelator sushi restaurants, karaoke bars, and cartoon character 
merchandising, Japanese culture industry products and ideas have, since the last decade 
of the second millennium in particular, permeated the everyday lives of people as far 
apart as Berlin and Bombay, Sydney and Shanghai, Jakarta and Jamaica, Utah and, as we 
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saw above, Ulaan Bataar. In the words of Saya Shiraishi, “Japanese popular culture is 
becoming Asian popular culture” (Shiraishi 1997: 236). 
This is not – or should not be – surprising, although the sentiment may be a little 
exaggerated. The growth of any major economy more or less automatically brings with it a 
number of residuals that, on the one hand, threaten the style in which other nations 
imagine themselves as finite, sovereign, political communities (Anderson 1983: 15-16) and, 
on the other, contribute to theories of cultural homogenization and heterogenization in the 
context of globalization. In a seminal essay devoted to unpicking what has proved, and is 
still proving, to be a thorny theoretical issue, Arjun Appadurai pointed out that most small 
or less-developed polities are worried about the possibility of cultural absorption – 
especially by those others that are nearby (and mentions the fear of Japanization on the 
part of Koreans). In other words, one man’s imagined community may become another’s 
political prison (Appadurai 1990: 295). Such thoughts are pertinent to a discussion of the 
spread of Japanese popular culture (henceforth “J-Cult” [J-bunka])1 in the Asian region 
where, almost without exception, nation states have been grappling with the legacy of 
both Western and Japanese colonialism and seeking to establish identities that will allow 
them to be accepted as members of the “club” of advanced industrialized trading nations.  
In order to explore what he saw as “fundamental disjunctures between economy, 
culture and politics,” Appadurai (1990: 296) suggested that we should perhaps explore 
globalization processes in terms of five different kinds of cultural flows – or, of what he 
chose to call “scapes” – of people (ethnoscapes), images (mediascapes), machinery 
(technoscapes), money (finanscapes) and ideas (ideoscapes). These scapes are constructed 
from all sorts of different perspectives by people, organizations and institutions 
interacting at all levels, from macro- to micro-levels of society. Although global cultural 
flows increasingly create disjunctures between these scapes, together they constitute the 
building blocks of multiple, historically situated, “imagined worlds” (1990: 296, 301). 
This fertile suggestion I have myself picked up in an earlier publication where I 
distinguished between “hard” (finance and technology) and “soft” (media and ideals) 
scapes, with people acting as the intermediaries between them (Moeran 2000). As the 
Japanese economy has grown over the second half of the 20th century, so have Japanese 
business organizations begun to move abroad (especially to Southeast Asia), where they 
have introduced new technologies and made long-term financial investments. Japanese 
employees have also moved back and forth between Japanese main and Asian (or 
European and American) branch offices and their presence in foreign countries has led to 
further developments abroad: notably, the introduction of Japanese schools and Japanese 
food stores, but also new religious movements and – more gradually – commodities 
connected with a Japanese lifestyle. The latter itself, thanks partially to rapidly increasing 
tourism and the flow of millions of Japanese abroad during the 1980s and 90s, made 
people at the “local” end of these globalizing flows more and more aware of and 
                                                 
1 In introducing the neologism “J-Cult,” I am, of course, following the lead set by the abbreviation of 
Japanese pop music to “J pop.” At the same time, however, I believe that “J-Cult” neatly expresses the 
fashionable nature of Japanese popular culture, which has to some extent become a cult form among many 
young people in the Asian region. 
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interested in Japanese culture. In this respect, I prefer to regard popular culture as a “taste 
culture,” designed to “entertain, inform, and beautify life” and consisting of values, the 
cultural forms which express those values… and the media in which they are expressed” 
(Gans 1974: 10). 
In other words, all five of Appadurai’s scapes may be discerned in the flow of 
Japanese taste culture into the Asian region. Firstly, J-Cult has often depended on new 
technologies – including, for example, video recording. Secondly, it is the result of 
financial investment in those technologies, as well as in production and distribution 
facilities established locally. Thirdly, it has involved people – including, importantly, the 
marketing (more or less successfully) of celebrities from Japan’s entertainment world, as 
well as engineers, designers, and others in Japan’s corporate business world. Fourthly, it 
has encompassed all kinds of media and images – ranging from cartoons and associated 
characters like Doraemon and Hello Kitty, to fashion, film, magazines, pop music, 
television programmes, and so on. And finally, it has brought with it sets of ideals 
reflecting Japanese cultural predispositions and myths of the kind that invariably 
accompany the production, content and marketing of popular cultural forms. 
 
The Spread of J-Cult 
Look up any evening’s television entertainment in a Hong Kong newspaper and you 
generally find the territory’s Chinese language television stations airing programmes with 
titles like Mask Rider Black, Tekkaman Blade, Chibimanko-chan, and Japanese Idol Theatre. Many 
of these are dubbed into Cantonese and feature products of Japan’s animation industry 
(for example, Doraemon, Sailor Moon, Dr. Slump, Captain Tsuga and Dragonball). These also 
appear in comic book form, with Sailor Moon translated as Mei Siu Lui Jin Si, Dragon Z into 
Lung Jiu Z, and Slam Dunk into Lam Yi Tong Yap Cheung. These media character creators − 
Tezuka Osamu, Shimayama Akira, Fujiko Fujio and Takahashi Rumiko − are household 
names among Hong Kong fans, and the characters themselves decorate everything from 
pencil cases and stationery to baby sponges, towels and other domestic products to create 
what have been aptly called “image alliances” (cf. Shiraishi 1997: 225). It seems that in 
Hong Kong, and elsewhere in the East and Southeast Asian region, everyone’s favourite 
cartoon character is to be found somewhere on people’s clothing, accessories, school 
equipment, household goods − as well as in almost every store where an ubiquitous 
maneki neko cat squats in a window or by the cash register beckoning good fortune and 
wealth for its owner. 
There are various factors underpinning developments such as these – factors that 
have first enabled and then encouraged the spread of J-Cult into the Asian region as a 
whole. The first of these is financial and economic. When the G7 group of nations decided 
in 1986 to float the US dollar in an attempt to combat Japanese exports as part of the so-
called Plaza Accord, Japanese companies found themselves with virtually no choice but to 
relocate their manufacturing facilities overseas, as part of an essential production cost 
cutting strategy. This not only enabled them to continue to export cheaper goods to the 
United States and elsewhere; it assisted in the development of local economies in the 
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countries in Southeast Asia that they chose for their operations: Thailand, Malaysia, 
Indonesia and, through Hong Kong, mainland China.  
The second, related to economic growth, is demographic. As a result of the burgeoning 
economies of these Southeast Asian countries (which themselves kick-started other 
economies in their wake), there developed a new Asian middle class that was salaried, 
located in rapidly urbanizing or already urban settings, comparatively young, and looking 
to spend its money on leisure and entertainment. Not unnaturally, as part of a kind of 
“flying geese” theory, this new middle class looked to Japan as the only non-Western 
industrialised superpower. After all, their own lives were rapidly coming to resemble 
those of people like them living in Japan and, as their local media constantly reminded 
them, a Japanese lifestyle came to be seen as the desired Asian middle class lifestyle 
(Ogawa 2004: 147). So they started to import and imitate different aspects of J-Cult that 
gained their attention: comic books, television cartoons, J-pop music, and Japanese 
fashions that were picked up all over Asia without ever reaching New York, Paris, London 
or Milan. J-Cult has thus been used as part of the fabrication and remoulding of identities 
among – especially young – city people living in the Asian region. Here we should note 
that “Asian interconnections forged by the flows of taste culture are not national ones. 
They are predominantly between urban spaces, between global cit[i]es – Tokyo, Seoul, 
Hong Kong, Taipei, Shanghai, and so on” (Iwabuchi 2002: 200). As has been remarked in 
other contexts, “it is in the city that contemporary popular culture… has its home” 
(Chambers 1986: 17).  
But interconnections have also been forged within generations. In this respect − as 
with its urban centredness, where city people are separated from those living in the 
country − J-Cult has been both an integrating and disintegrating force. In a sense, because 
of their different tastes, it has driven a wedge between generations in different Asian 
countries, while simultaneously uniting all young people on the basis of a shared taste 
across the urbanized parts of the region (Belsen and Bremner 2004: 97). We should note, 
though, that the development of this young, well-off, urban, Asian middle class coincided 
with a demographic trend in Japan that has seen the number of Japanese teenagers peak at 
the end of the 1980s2 and fall by one quarter in the intervening years. In other words, 
manufacturers and media alliances in Japan have realised that the long-term decrease in 
demand for J-Cult in the home market can be more than offset by the newly emerging 
Asian markets. 
There is a political element, thirdly, attached to the adoption of J-Cult by young 
people in Asia and this concerns precisely the generation gap. Whereas their parents and 
grandparents have long felt antagonistic towards Japan, Japanese and “things Japanese” 
because of the latter’s various “activities” in the Asian region during the course of the 
Pacific War, the present young generation in East and Southeast Asia has for the most part 
put such resentment aside. Although it is extremely difficult to forecast the exact turns that 
will be taken in diplomatic relations between Japan and its neighbours, it is possible that J-
Cult will facilitate communication and help bring an end to a particular historical era – as 
it is, perhaps, doing in South Korea, following former Japanese Prime Minister Keizō 
                                                 
2 The number of 16 year olds in Japan peaked at 2 million in 1989, and has since fallen to below 1.5 million. 
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Obuchi’s formal apology for his country’s war crimes and the South Korean Government’s 
consequent relaxation of its ban on cultural imports in the late 1990s (Belsen and Bremner 
2004: 96-7). 
The political factor is, as intimated, extremely complex. On the one hand, there are 
conservative cultural critics in countries like Taiwan who perceive J-Cult as a “threat” to 
their own socio-cultural norms because it takes economic advantage of people and 
“degrades” local cultures. A similar argument has been put forward by, for example, 
cartoonists in various Asian countries who, bewailing the virtual disappearance of local 
traditions in Indonesia, Taiwan, South Korea and elsewhere because of the ubiquity of 
Japanese manga comics, have “decried the manga invasion as part of Japan’s continuing 
economic and cultural imperialism in the post-colonial era” (Lent 2001: 4). On the other 
hand, J-Cult is used as an argument for freedom and democracy. The fact that those who 
adopt it abroad are clearly comfortable with foreign cultural elements shows that they 
have self-confidence and can make their own decisions. They have got beyond fighting in 
the streets for basic human rights (however these may be defined) and that is a good thing 
(Yu-Fen Ko quoted in Belsen and Bremner 2004: 101-2). 
Finally, there are the cultural factors relating to the spread and acceptance of J-Cult in 
different parts of Asia. One of the things about Japanese, as opposed to American, popular 
culture in Asia is that it is “familiarly different.” A television drama like O-Shin, or 
example, is more likely to appeal to Asian people who have experienced the Pacific War, 
gender relations dominated by men, and other issues brought out by the drama than it is 
(immediately, at least) to north Europeans or Americans whose experiences of war, gender 
equality, and so on are very different. Similarly, a Japanese young people’s fashion and 
lifestyle magazine like nonno has much more to offer people in South Korea and Taiwan, 
where local editions are published, than a similarly targeted magazine like Cosmopolitan 
whose focus on the dos and don’ts of sex and relationships seems out of kilter with their 
own lifestyles.  
Although there is always the problem of transnational cultural power in the way in 
which local audiences find pleasure in consuming cultural products from a supposedly 
culturally similar country like Japan, the perception of “cultural proximity” can contribute 
to a sense of shared regional community. Of course, in many ways, this cultural proximity 
is constructed by media organizations keen to distribute their products. It is not something 
that exists “out there” (Iwabuchi 2002: 133-34). As Koichi Iwabuchi (2002: 50) notes, 
“Japan’s relatively dominant position in intra-Asian flows… generates a positive sense of 
cultural immediacy” among Asian consumers of J-Cult who feel “a sense of co-evalness,” 
in the sense that they live in the same age and social conditions as Japanese and share with 
them lifestyles and tastes that are similar enough to enable them to imagine together an 
“Asian modernity” (Iwabuchi 2002: 153-54). 
At the same time as this sense of familiar difference is fostered by images in the 
media, it is experienced in real life, thanks to the development of tourism that enables 
those living in the Asian region to visit Japan. Chinese and Korean can be heard on the 
streets of Tokyo as department stores in the Ginza, boutiques in Harajuku and Shibuya, 
and theme parks like Sanrio’s Puroland, are frequented by foreign tourists (10 per cent of 
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Puroland’s 1.38 million visitors are from overseas [Belson and Bremner 2004: 48]). Such 
foreign experiences allow people from different parts of Asia to feel more “at home” with 
one another. 
This sense of identity is reinforced in all sorts of different ways in everyday life. For 
example, Asian people shopping for Japanese fashions can readily find the right cut and 
sizes to match their physique, as well as the most appropriate material for their home 
environment (like cotton for summer clothing). This is not true for those Japanese who go 
to Paris to replenish their wardrobes. Asian people also readily identify with Japanese 
manga comic books and cartoon characters because, for the most part, they have such 
traditions back home (see contributions by Leonard Rifas and Mary Ann Farquhar in Lent 
1995) and are often more used to reading ideographs and icons than they are alphabets. 
The fact that most societies in the region have musical traditions making use of the 
pentatonic scale to some extent enables an immediate sharing of popular musical tastes 
(although many other factors, of course, are at stake [Chun, Rossiter and Shoesmith 2004]). 
 
Women’s Fashion Magazines 
Another aspect of J-Cult’s mediascape is its information-age goods, plastered as ads on 
buses and trams, lit up as neon signs on the tops of sky-scraping buildings, and as real 
products lining the shelves of crowded supermarkets and stores. There are isotonic drinks, 
instant noodles, packets of seaweed, plastic containers, tape dispensers, cash boxes, safety 
scissors − you name it, they all come from Japan. Computer software outlets, too, offer a 
wide range of Japanese TV games, while pinball arcades feature machines decorated with 
sumō wrestlers and flashing lights that accompany the disappearance of the player’s ball 
with a triumphant “banzai!” In the streets of Hong Kong, Seoul and Taipei, stalls sell 
young Japanese women’s fashion magazines − nonno, JJ, Ryūkō Tsūshin and With − each 
filled with information on the latest styles to be found on the streets of Tokyo and Osaka. 
Women’s fashion magazines have for many, many years depicted in their pages 
European and American fashion designers’ periodic off-and-on love affair with “the 
Orient.” It should have come as no surprise, therefore, that fashion magazines published 
in Japan and other parts of Asia should have extended this Western interest in the East by 
orientalising their own fashion images and by starting to use other Asian countries and, 
occasionally, models for their fashion stories. Thus, in the 1990s we come across fashion 
stories ranging from “Oriental Colour,” “Impressions de Chine” (both Marie Claire Japon, 
January 1993) and “Asia Beat” (Oggi , April 1995), to “A dignity of China” and “Oriental 
Mania” (both Ryūkō Tsūshin, April 1997), by way of other stories set in Hong Kong and 
Macau (Oggi, October and November 1995). Occasionally, the exoticism is expressed in 
other than obviously regional terms: for example, hi fashion’s story “Stand Sharp in 
Silence,” featuring a Korean model wearing Hiroko Koshino clothes in Seoul (December 
1991).3
                                                 
3 The same model is featured in the same Japanese magazine’s December issue in the following year: “Across 
the [sic] Asia: Seoul Collection in Mongolia” (hi fashion, December 1992). 
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For their part, Hong Kong magazines also began to bring Orientalist images into their 
pages. Marie Claire Hong Kong, for example, published “The Eastern Dream” in May 1995, 
and was soon followed by Elle Hong Kong, which printed an exoticising “Bright Lights, Big 
City” feature of Hong Kong fashion designers’ clothes in its September 1996 issue. 
Cosmopolitan Hong Kong adopted the same tack, though with a Caucasian model, in 
“Eastern Chic” (June 1997), while in July 1997, taking its cue from the handover of the 
former British territory to the PRC, Elle Hong Kong titled its Basic Style section “China 
Girl.” 
Japanese advertisers have to some extent followed the lead taken by Japanese fashion 
magazines. In a significant move, the cosmetics giant, Shiseido, employed two former 
Hong Kong beauty queens (Li Ka Yan and Chan Wai Lam), along with a Japanese model, 
in its PN (Pieds Nus) make-up ads in the spring of 1997 − presumably as part of an 
integrated Asian marketing strategy. Its headline read in English, “The Beauty of myth, 
the soulmate of Chic,” and contrasted somewhat sharply with the Japanese “Setting light 
to the spirit of make-up” (Mēku tamashii ni hi o tsukeru). In a similar move to obviate the 
differences between Japanese and other peoples living in the Asian region, Seiko 
advertised its Lukia watches in Japan by showing a mixed group of Asians and 
Caucasians standing in front of a Hong Kong double-decker red bus and adding the 
slogan in English, “No Age, No Gender.” For its part, Toyota photographed its Corolla 
Levin car with Hong Kong license plates against a backdrop of neon lights, most 
prominent of which was Yue Hwa Chinese Products − all for a launch in Japan. In a 
different campaign, the same company used a visual of “David Chan, Toyota Regional 
Manager, After Sales” based in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, practising Japanese kendo 
fencing − this time in an Asian English-language business magazine. In its Chinese-
language ad for a Mi-Jockey Headphone Stereo set, Panasonic published a photo of a local 
Hong Kong celebrity sitting in a bus seemingly full of old-style Red guards from the PRC 
(Cosmopolitan HK, March 1995). Asia, it seems, is an integral part and extension of Japan’s 
commodity culture. 
There is something else about advertising that is, perhaps, worth noting regarding 
Japan’s (desired) integration in the Asian region.4 When a Japanese is featured in a non-
Japanese setting − shopping in Singapore, dancing in Bali, or relaxing on a Thai beach, for 
example − she is almost always depicted as being integral to the scene or occasion shown. 
In other words, as tourists Japanese are depicted not as strangers from a foreign country, 
so much as local participants in a particular regional culture. This contrasts rather 
markedly with English and American advertisements depicting the “Orient” where 
Caucasians are generally made to seem somehow out of place when put in an Asian 
environment (Moeran 1996). In this way, Japan is integrated into an Asian commodity and 
taste culture that creates market and product, rather than national and cultural, differences. 
 
                                                 
4 The following comment is also true of Japanese depicted in European and American settings. 
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The Smell of J-Cult 
One of the comments frequently made about J-Cult abroad is that it is not like American 
popular culture. It does not proclaim itself as “Japanese” in the way that American 
popular culture proclaims its “American-ness.” In other words, it is not marked by a kind 
of “in-your-face” national content or style in the way that American popular culture has 
been perceived to be – giving rise to such phrases as “Cocacolanization,” “Disneyfication,” 
“McDonaldization,” and so on to describe the globalization of the American economy and 
associated “scapes”. Rather, it has been described as being characterised by “soft power” 
(Shiraishi 1997). Its aim is not outright colonization, but a kind of quietly tidal 
“Corollanization” (Moeran 2000).  More trenchantly, Koichi Iwabuchi (2002, and 
elsewhere) has used the phrase “culturally odourless” to describe products associated 
with J-Cult. Indeed, in his discussion of audiovisual products, he picks up on past 
marketing and consumer knowledge in Japan to talk of the “’culturally odorless’ three C’s: 
consumer technologies (such as VCRs, karaoke, and the Walkman); comics and cartoons 
(animation); and computer/video games” (Iwabuchi 2002: 27). 
By “cultural odour” Iwabuchi refers to the fact that some commodities are associated 
positively with widely disseminated images of the lifestyle of their country of origin. 
Unlike McDonald’s, however, which is powerfully associated with people’s constructions 
of what constitutes “America” as an imagined community, Japanese goods are not 
marketed “on the back of a Japanese way of life” (Featherstone 1995: 9). The Sony 
Walkman, for example, is first and foremost a portable tape-recorder which may 
incorporate some elements of “Japaneseness” in terms of its characteristics of 
compactness, simplicity and fine detailing (du Gay et al. 1997: 69-74), but which is not 
generally perceived as evoking a specifically “Japanese” lifestyle (Iwabuchi 2002: 28). 
Similarly, cartoon characters have long been commented on for their large eyes and 
generally “non-Japanese” look (e.g. Schodt 1983), so that J-Cult media products in general 
lack an obviously national origin (mukokuseki) (Iwabuchi 2002: 28). 
The idea that J-Cult is culturally odourless suggests that a “de-territorialized” pop 
song, television programme, fashion style, or cartoon character can be readily assimilated 
by local consumer audiences and “re-territorialized” to suit the latter’s preferences and 
lifestyles. This certainly happens. When I was teaching at the University of Hong Kong in 
the mid-1990s, I recall some of my students getting rather angry with me for suggesting 
that one currently popular Canto-pop hit had in fact originated in Japan: Kitaguni no Haru, 
sung by Sen Masao who, ironically, was (and still is, of course) a Korean Japanese – 
ironically because this particular style of “traditionally Japanese” enka song is said to have 
originated in Korea.  
  To some extent, the cultural odourless nature of J-Cult probably helps facilitate both 
regional integration and the perception of cultural proximity. In this respect, as Iwabuchi 
(2002: 94) points out, the absence of cultural odour is used for strategic marketing 
purposes. “Japanese media industries seem to think that the suppression of Japanese 
cultural odour is imperative if they are to make inroads into international markets.” But 
there is, I think, more to it than this (although I shall return to this point in a minute). The 
fact that my students firmly believed, or wanted to believe, that the song was Cantonese, 
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and the subsequent resentment they displayed when I insisted that it was not, suggests 
that they felt somehow deceived as consumers by the lack of cultural odour. In other 
words, marketers of J-Cult are still worried enough about the historical associations in the 
region of Japan and the Japanese to consciously erase all markers of “Japaneseness.” In 
this sense, cultural odour takes on a political, and not just, economic “fragrance.” 
In fact, this example suggests something else about cultural odour: that the Japanese 
not only consciously avoid giving their own J-Cult products a “Japanese fragrance” when 
marketing them abroad; they consciously deprive popular cultural forms from other 
countries of their odour by making them peculiarly “Japanese” in Japan (cf. Iwabuchi 1999: 
181). This has frequently been remarked upon in terms of “adoption and adaptation,”5 but 
it marks a certain irony in Japan’s relations with the world around. On the one hand, they 
play the card of “tradition” − as when Japanese business leaders, for example, will go out 
of their way to explain their economic successes in terms of Japanese cultural specificities 
and corporate organization patterns (Yoshino 1992) − even though some of these patterns 
have themselves originated in the United States.6 Particular J-Cult forms, like enka, 
Japanese tea bowls, or mingei arts and crafts, are mythologised as “purely Japanese,” even 
though the first two owe their origins to Korean culture and the last to William Morris and 
the British Arts and Crafts Movement. On the other hand, they have wiped out virtually 
all elements of “Japaneseness” and tradition when marketing J-Cult abroad. This is made 
possible, perhaps, precisely because J-Cult is not “high” culture. Kabuki and Noh theatre, 
the tea ceremony and flower arrangement, are marketed strictly according to their place 
within “Japanese tradition” as products of the country’s high culture.  
But what does all this talk of “culture” signify? 
First, Japanese culture is a concept that has taken on immense importance in Japan 
during at least two crucial stages in its modernizing processes when people had to cope, 
firstly, with radical social changes brought about by the Meiji Restoration and secondly, 
with equally radical changes initiated by SCAP during the post-war occupation. The idea 
of both “Japan” and “culture” contributed to the building up of an imagined community 
when that community was extremely unsettled and likely to fragment. “Culture” thus 
became a fixed point that people could turn to as they reconstructed their identities in the 
face of the “four –izations” of the West (especially America), modernity, industrialism, 
and urbanization. 
In this respect, secondly, culture becomes something administrated, and it is hard not 
to feel a sense of discomfort once this point is realised (Adorno 1991: 94). Such discomfort 
raises a question. Is there anything to “Japanese culture” other than its being a constructed 
(and administrated) myth? Here, the link between culture and smell made by Koichi 
Iwabuchi is extremely thought-provoking. How calculated or how unreflexive was 
Iwabuchi’s neologism of cultural odour? How come it was a Japanese, and not a European 
or American, scholar who produced this phrase as part of a discussion of the influences of 
                                                 
5 Adorno (1991: 58) argues that “all mass culture is fundamentally adaptation” 
6 Cf., for example, Tsutsui 1996 and Salaman 1997 on quality circles and management practices; and Du Gay 
et al. 1997: 71-2 on design. 
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an indigenous popular culture abroad? I ask these questions because the sense of smell is 
extraordinarily underplayed – essentially ignored – in Western societies. It is the least 
developed of all the senses. Yet, research suggests that in Japan, smell is quite highly 
developed and that Japanese (especially women) are comparatively perceptive of and 
sensitive to smell (Hakuhōdō Sōgō Seikatsu Kenkyūjo 1994: 55-63). And, as anyone who 
has read Genji Monogatari knows, such sensitivity has a long historical tradition (among 
some classes of people, at least). 
So, thirdly, what does Iwabuchi’s use of cultural odour mean? Is it an insightful 
analytical term? Or is it just a culturally peculiar way of analysing contemporary 
marketing methods applied to the marketing of J-Cult? Why use the word “culture” at all? 
After all, culture is so pervasive in our everyday lives that it ceases really to provide a 
distinctive analytical category. Partly for this reason, Horkheimer and Adorno decided to 
drop the phrase “mass culture” in favour of “culture industry” when writing their 
Dialectic of Enlightenment (Adorno 1991: 85). Although since criticised for their elitism, and 
for seeing the culture industry as a monolithic, all powerful entity, it is worth recalling 
their vision: 
“The culture industry fuses the old and familiar into a new quality. In all its 
branches, products which are tailored for consumption by masses, and which 
to a great extent determine the nature of that consumption, are manufactured 
more or less according to plan. The individual branches are similar in structure 
or at least fit into each other, ordering themselves into a system almost without 
a gap.” 
Adorno (1991: 85) 
Now, Iwabuchi’s own research shows that the consumption of J-Cult is by no means 
determined by the industry (in his case, television) that produces it. But, by labelling all 
products of J-Cult “culturally odourless,” he is ascribing to Japan’s entertainment 
industries precisely the monolithic power that Horkheimer and Adorno (1979: 120-169) 
perceived and for which they have been criticised. Surely, there are some products that are 
culturally odourless and some that are not (consider the difference between samurai films 
and the kind of television romance drama series analysed by Iwabuchi), and we need to 
classify them along a continuum, perhaps, between the flagrantly fragrant and the odiously 
odourless. 
How to do this? In Japan, as in the United States, there is a preoccupation with – 
some might say a fixation on – culture, rather than with what, as a social anthropologist, I 
would see as more relevant to critical analysis: the social relations that exist among people, 
and between things and people. It is the different ways in which people are thrown 
together around particular things – an animated cartoon, a samurai film, or a computer 
game – and how they negotiate meanings among themselves through the thing that links 
them that I find most relevant and important in discussions of taste cultures and their 
dissemination in regional flows. In other words, we need to do research on and analyse 
carefully, not just the contents of J-Cult (or other countries’ popular cultural forms) and 
how they are appreciated and used by consumers (the approach taken by so many people 
working in the field of Cultural Studies), but the process of their production and circulation 
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or distribution. In other words, we have to address the total social processes surrounding 
the production, appraisal, marketing and consumption of popular culture. How does a 
designer, say, differ in her approach to the creation of a new product like a Walkman from 
someone working in Sales or Marketing? How do they negotiate meanings among 
themselves to enable a successful product to be manufactured? What say does the Finance 
office have in limiting costs? And how do those contracted to advertise that product 
successfully weld the manufacturing company’s images of both the product and itself as a 
corporation with what they learn about consumers in different markets? And what, if 
anything, do consumers themselves think of the product? How do they use it in their 
everyday lives, and how does this actual usage differ from that planned by the designer, 
or marketer, or advertising executive? It is this social rather than cultural approach to the 
study of J-Cult (and commodities in general) that is, I think, useful. 
Finally, if there is something to be gained from using the notion of culture in 
discussing the flow of Japanese taste culture into and around the Asian region, we also 
need to be very wary of the potential “disavowal” that the word permits. Here, I refer to 
the concept of dénégation developed by Pierre Bourdieu (1992) in his analysis of fields of 
cultural production. In the field of art, as he pointed out, there is great potential for 
participants to pretend not to be doing what they are doing, as well as pretend to be doing 
what they are not doing. The particular focus of participants’ collective disavowal tends to 
be economic factors. Artists, critics and connoisseurs careful construct an aura around 
works of art that is entirely divorced from commercial interest.  
What I want to stress here is that a focus on cultural aspects of J-Cult (including 
whether it is “fragrant” or “odourless”) suggests a certain disavowal of the commercial. 
This is unacceptable because popular culture these days is, first and foremost, a market 
product. Even though academics may be aware of this, and by no means all of them will 
publicly recognize it in their writings, they can be said to be contributing to a disavowal of 
the economic by analysing J-Cult in terms of “culture” – something of which I am myself 
here guilty by fixing on the term “J-Cult.” By so doing we can be accused of being, with 
those who produce, advertise and distribute J-Cult products, “adversaries in collusion” 
(Bourdieu 1992: 79) since all of us are actively lacquering those products with a veneer of 
culture (or absence of culture) and failing to analyse critically the economic foundations 
and consequences of their manufacture, distribution, representation and consumption in 
the Asian region. In other words, what is required in analysis of popular cultural flows in 
Asia is research that looks at the production of media commodities, at their content, and 
their consumption. In particular, we need to know to what extent – if at all – those 
involved in the production of J-Cult actively construct its culturally odourless character, 
and who precisely is involved in this construction. It is only after such research that we 
can begin to understand whether cultural odour is a conscious disavowal of the 
commercial, or whether it somehow just emerges because of the way people are as 
Japanese. That is to say, academic understandings of J-Cult cannot be separated from 
understandings negotiated among those involved along the continuum from its 
production to consumption. We, too, give J-Cult its “social life” (Appadurai 1986). 
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